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INTRODUCTION

For the past several decades, we have been assailed by the mantra that

the duty of corporate directors is to maximize shareholder value, even if
doing so adversely affects others who have a stake in the enterprise, such
as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the local community, and
the environment.' The emergence and persistence of this incantation is

puzzling in light of the consensus that it is in society's best interest for
individuals to behave ethically and to use the resources under their

control in a responsible manner, which implies a more global view of
rights and responsibilities. Among other things, behaving ethically and

responsibly means considering not only the effects of one's behavior on
oneself, but also the effects of that behavior on others. In addition, many
espouse the doctrine of stewardship whereby the ownership and control
of property, or the power to affect the lives and fortunes of others,
implies a duty to use that property and power wisely, for the benefit of
others.2 Why, then, are good men and women encouraged to hang up
their ethical hat at the boardroom door when they assume the mantle of

directorship?3

This Article argues that the nature of the corporate form4 coupled with
1. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How
Investor DiversificationAffects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429, 429-30 (1998).
Although thirty states have enacted legislation specifically authorizing directors to take
all constituencies into account, see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text, finance
scholars and economists repeat this refrain. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying

text.

2. For example, John D. Rockefeller stated in a speech on July 8, 1941, "I believe
that every right implies a responsibility; every opportunity an obligation; every
possession, a duty." MICHAEL C. THOMsETr, A TREASURY OF BUSINESS QUOTATIONS
130 (1990). Rockefeller also asserted that "the power to make money is a gift from
God... to be developed and used to the best of our ability for the good of mankind."
Paul Johnson, God's Gift to American Industry, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at X1.
3. As one chief executive officer stated, "As CEO I have a duty to do what's best

for the shareholders. I can't let my own sense of right and wrong get in the way." R.
EDWARD FREEMAN & DANIEL R. GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE SEARCH
FOR ETHICS 23 (1988); see also Appendix A.
4. As English essayist, Sydney Smith, noted two centuries ago, "You never
expected justice from a company, did you? They have neither a soul to lose, nor a body
to kick." LOUIS E. BOONE, QUOTABLE BuSINESs 224 (2d ed. 1999). Sir Edward Coke
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an exclusive focus on shareholder value leads to economically and
socially inefficient results. The "profit maximization" view of directors'
duties ignores the historical reasons why corporations were given special
privileges, such as limited liability, by the state.5 This narrow view
should be replaced with a doctrine of stewardship that imposes a more
comprehensive view of the corporation's and directors' responsibility to
manage the vast resources held in corporate form.6 This broader view is
consistent not only with the values of a free market economy, but also
with modem corporate jurisprudence.
It also reflects modem
organizational theory that emphasizes the importance of systems
thinking, or thinking about the whole rather than just the parts.7
In the spirit of stewardship, transparency, and self-regulation, this
Article recommends an additional securities disclosure requirement that
public corporations disclose the impact of major corporate decisions on
affected constituencies, including shareholders, employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, communities, governmental entities, and the
corporation's management. In this manner, this Article proposes to
replace the veil of secrecy with the mantle of stewardship.
II. ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The modem theory of the firm dates to Ronald Coase's insight that
similarly asserted, "[Corporations] cannot commit treason, nor be [ ] outlawed, nor
excommunicate[d], for they have no souls ....
Case of Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep.

960, 973 (K.B. 1907).
5. See infra Part IV.

6. Corporations account for nearly 100% of all national output. See RALPH
ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BoTroM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE DO
BAD THINGS 86 (1996).
7. See generally PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE
OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990). Senge maintains that, like the interconnection
between rain, groundwater, and the sky,
Business and other human endeavors are also systems. They, too, are
bound by invisible fabrics of interrelated actions, which often take years to
fully play out their effects on each other. Since we are part of that lacework
ourselves, it's doubly hard to see the whole pattern of change. Instead, we
tend to focus on snapshots of isolated parts of the system, and wonder why our
deepest problems never seem to get solved. Systems thinking is a conceptual
framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the
past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to
change them effectively.
Id. at 7. In discussing leverage, Senge asserts that "small, well-focused actions can
sometimes produce significant, enduring improvements, if they're in the right place." Id.
at 64.

firms exist as a substitute for more costly modes of transacting.'
According to Coase, transaction costs of negotiating, contracting,
transacting, coordinating, enforcing, and discharging rights and
obligations under a set of contracts can be reduced by creating a firm
that facilitates transactions between the consumers and suppliers of
inputs. 9 Coase's insight has been extended by several finance and
organizational scholars who view the firm as a set of interrelated
contracts among the various suppliers of the factor inputs and the
purchasers of the final outputs." From this perspective, the firm's
claimants go beyond stockholders to include employees, customers,

suppliers, creditors, and communities."
Despite this conception of the firm as a set of relationships, of which
investors are just one subset, economists and finance scholars assume2
that the sole purpose of a corporation is to create shareholder value.
This assumption has created its own reality to the point where the
assumption has become a prescription.
Milton Friedman goes even further with the claim that maximization

of shareholder profits is not only economically responsible, but also
socially responsible. He expressed this "social responsibility" view in
an article whose title conveys its thesis, A Friedman Doctrine - The
Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.4 In the body
of his article, Friedman elaborates as follows:
[A] corporate executive ....has direct responsibility to his employers....

That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires,
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied

8. See Bradford Cornell & Alan C. Shapiro, Corporate Stakeholders and
CorporateFinance, 16 FIN. MGMT. 5, 5 (1987).

9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 783 (1972); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 307 (1976); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS

3-4 (1975);

Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownership and Control,26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 303 (1983); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, AppropriableRents,
and the Competitive ContractingProcess,21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1978).
II. See Cornell & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 5.
12. See PAUL MILGROM & JoHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 39 (1992).

13. See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENTAND POLICY 3 (11th
ed. 1998) ("The objective of a company must be to create value for its shareholders.").
14. Milton Friedman, A FriedmanDoctrine-TheSocial Responsibility of Business
Is to hcrease Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. For an
earlier and condensed version of Friedman's argument, see MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

133-36 (1962).
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in ethical custom.

5

Friedman does not explain what he meant by the phrase "ethical
custom," though in a different piece he states the caveat differently,
saying that the profit-maximizing goal should be pursued while
"stay[ing] within the rules of the game," explained as "open and free
6
competition, without deception or fraud.'
Friedman argues against any suggestion that managers have an
obligation to use corporate resources to promote social goals or moral
values in ways not required by law or ethical custom.'7 Providing
employment, eliminating discrimination, reducing pollution, preventing
inflation, and fighting poverty are mentioned by Friedman as examples
of such goals. 8 Friedman further argues that by promoting social goals
with corporate resources, corporate
' 9 management is engaging in de facto
"taxation without representation.
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means anticipate this argument by
contending that maximization of shareholder profits is the only standard
that can prevent irresponsible management.' ° The phenomenological
genesis of this irresponsibility, according to Berle and Means, was the
creation of passive ownership coupled with the strong, separate control
that results from the sheer size of modem corporations.2 ' This passive
ownership would by its nature lead to inefficient use of the property.
As Berle and Means explain, were the owners of an enterprise to manage
15.

Friedman, supranote 14, at 33; see FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 133.

16. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 133; see Friedman, supra note 14, at 32; see also
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE

75-76 (1975) (discussing caveat).
17. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 33.
18. See id. By social goals, then, Friedman appears to refer to every value not
explicitly protected by law or ethical custom.
19. Id. at 122.
20. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 122-23 & n.1 (rev. ed. 1932) (citing pervasive
mismanagement of various railroads between 1900 and 1915 as evidence that
management, left to its own devices, would choose personal profit even at cost of
bankrupting corporation). The book was the product of a collaboration that started in

BEHAVIOR

1928, when Adolf Berle, Jr. was appointed research director of a project funded by the
Social Science Research Council of America to investigate the impact of corporations on
American society. Gardiner C. Means was hired to conduct a careful statistical analysis

of the growth of large corporations. See Robert Hessen, The Modem Corporationand
Private Property: A Reappraisal,26 J.L. & ECON. 273, 274 (1983) (summarizing the

history behind Berle and Means' collaboration).
21.
22.

See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 66.
See id. at 307-08.

the enterprise, they would have the classic profit motive to encourage
efficient behavior-if they are not efficient, they do not prosper.' If
owners are separate from managers, and the managers have effective
control, then managers have less economic incentive to be efficient
because profits are turned over to the owners. 24 Thus, they conclude, the
only way to ensure that managers behave efficiently is to create an

absolute duty to maximize shareholder profits.'
The essence of Berle's and Means' argument is that even if it might be
socially desirable to consider other constituencies, it is not practical
because the result is a situation in which directors are accountable to no

one:
[Y]ou can not abandon emphasis on "the view that business corporations exist
for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders" until such time as
you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else.... Otherwise the economic power now
mobilized and massed under the corporate form... is simply handed over,
weakly, to the present
administrators with a pious wish that something nice will
26
come out of it all.

The substance of this argument was articulated by Stanford Law
School Professor Joseph Grundfest, then a Commissioner of the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in a letter to Mario
Cuomo, Governor of New York, with respect to New York's proposed
constituency legislation, which granted directors the right to consider

other constituencies in their corporate deliberations:
[T]he grant of authority without accountability raises the real and present
danger that boards will use [the constituency statute] as a fig leaf. Specifically,
[the statute] may allow boards to rationalize decisions that they would not
otherwise support in the name of constituencies who are powerless to monitor
or challenge the actions that are purportedly taken in their interest. 27

23. See id. at 307-08, 345-51.
24. See id. at 345-51. This concept was not new. Adam Smith suggested:
[D]irectors of... companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a
private co-partnery frequently watch over their own.... Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of
the affairs of such a company.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

700 (Modern Library 1937) (1776), quoted in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent
Directors and the ALI CorporateGovernance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034,
1059 n.128 (1993).
25. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 354.
26. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note,
45 HARV. L. REv. 1365, 1367-68 (1932) (citation omitted).
27. Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), to Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York (June 6, 1989), quoted in

902
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The essence of these three arguments is that corporations must
maximize shareholder profits because it is (1) efficient (economically
responsible), (2) fair (socially responsible), and (3) practical (the only
standard that will work). All three arguments, however, are victims of
assumptions that do not comport with the realities of modem
corporations.
A. Market Failures
The efficiency, fairness, and practicality arguments share the classical
economic assumption that there are no externalities in the system that
would prevent efficient market outcomes. An externality is an action of
one party that affects the welfare of others." When externalities are
present, efficient market outcomes may not be possible.29 Toxic
discharge from a nearby factory, which spoils the neighbors'
environment and threatens their health, is an externality because it
affects people and firms other than those making the decisions. Market
inefficiencies occur to the extent that decision-makers do not take these
externally imposed costs into account in their decision making.
A singular goal of profit maximization creates the potential for market
inefficiencies by encouraging externalization of costs while retaining the
benefits of corporate actions. A case in point is the 1986 leveraged
buyout ("LBO") of Safeway. Prior to the LBO, Safeway's motto was
"Safeway Offers Security." 30 This implicit promise of security induced
Safeway employees to remain loyal to Safeway and to dedicate their
working lives to the company. After the LBO, the motto was replaced3
with language that included "Targeted Returns on Current Investment. '
The discharge of sixty-three thousand managers and workers ensued

through layoffs and store sales.32

Many thousands of Safeway

employees wound up either unemployed or forced into the part-time

Ron S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Assessing Transition
Costs?, 28 COLuM. LL. & Soc. PROBs. 145, 178 (1995). Constituency statutes are
discussed later. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
28. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 75.
29. See id. at 75; see also DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 202-205, 288-91 (1990).
30. Susan C. Faludi, The Reckoning: Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profitsbut Exacts a
Heavy Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1990, at Al.
31. Id.
32. See id.

work force.3 More than a year after the layoff, nearly 60 percent of
former Safeway employees in Dallas still had not found full time
employment.m Safeway employees saw their loyalty rewarded with a
severance package that included one-half week's salary per year worked
(up to eight weeks) and health benefits for two weeks.35
Prior to the LBO, Safeway had impressive financial results and was
trimming expenses through controlled attrition and target reductions.36
Thus, any value captured by shareholders was in large part at the
expense of employees, suppliers, customers, and communities that
served and were served by Safeway. 37 A purely legalistic view would
suggest that these employees had no contractual right to continued
employment.38 However, even to the extent that any individuals had
legal claims against Safeway for a breach of implied contract or breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the transaction costs of
pursuing such claims were prohibitive because of the inability to recover
punitive damages in contract cases.39
Even operations within legal and ethical constraints may have wideranging economic consequences not captured by narrowly defined
values. As Stanford economists Paul Milgrom and D. John Roberts
explain:
A firm's decisions about the design and placement of its factories can affect
community housing values, traffic, and environmental quality; its choices of
suppliers can affect the distribution of wages and profits among the potential
suppliers; and its pricing policy affects both competitors and customers....
With incomplete markets and imperfect bargaining, the way various
interests are weighed in decisions can have consequences for the efficiency of
the economic system that must not be ignored. For example, in the plant
closing decision, investments by workers and others in houses near the factory
may lose much of their value if the factory were to close. Such investments are
cospecialized with the plant. Efficiency then requires that the homeowners'

interests be given some weight in this decision. Similarly, the workers may

have invested in firm-specific human capital that is, by its very nature,
cospecialized with the plant. Closing the plant destroys the value of these
investments. The township as a whole may have invested in roads, sewage33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. In the United States, absent an express or implied employment agreement,
employees are employed at will and may be terminated without cause. See CONSTANCE

E.

BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST

422 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the at-will doctrine and judicially created
exceptions thereto).
39. Safeway did pay $8.2 million to settle a wrongful termination class action suit
and $750,000 to settle an age discrimination suit, but these damages are not
representative of the full externalities imposed on all constituencies by Safeway's
actions. See Faludi, supra note 30, at Al.
CENTURY
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treatment facilities, schools, and other assets whose value depends on the
plant's continued operation. 4°

Although it can be argued that all such interests should be considered
before any investments are made by any stakeholders, such a legalistic
approach to transactions is neither realistic nor would it necessarily
generate the most efficient result, because of the enormous transaction
costs that would be incurred in bringing all affected parties to the
bargaining table and negotiating all material terms with each of them.4
These interests are, nonetheless, real, and have bestowed benefits on the
Often, significant resources are committed by these
corporation.
stakeholders based on both explicit and implicit (though probably not
legally enforceable) promises made by organizations.4 ' This Article's
argument is simply that management should not be able to unilaterally
appropriate resources belonging to nonshareholder constituencies to
enhance shareholder value. To do so, without at least acknowledging
what they are doing, is misappropriation.
Jerry Sterner, businessman turned playwright, describes these

situations as follows:
Just talk about restructuring as positive and investors will buy it ....It's
really an admission of failure: We're closing this operation and firing these
people so that we can stay inbusiness. But we ain't paying the price. The
employees, the community, they pay the price. Meanwhile, the executives'
salaries go 43up and their benefits increase because they are making the "hard
decisions.

Nevertheless, Friedman's formulation of strict duties of management
compels these results by stating that any internalization of externalities
to favor a party that has no claim under law or custom is contrary to the
interests of the shareholders and therefore should be prohibited.44
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 318-19.
41. See id. at 303-05.
42. Cornell and Bradford argue that "many of the claims issued by management to
non-investor stakeholders take the form of tacit promises of continuing supply, timely
delivery, product enhancement, and job security." Corell & Shapiro, supra note 8, at
13. When promises are not kept, due to production delays, product recalls, litigation, or
the like, shareholder wealth may decline more than the actual cash outlays involved
because it will be harder for the firm to sell implicit claims (e.g., quality control). See id.
Indeed, "stakeholders may even require that tacit 'understandings' be replaced by
explicit contracts." Id.
43. Margot Slade, We Forgot to Write a Headline. But It's Not Our Fault, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 19, 1995, §3, at 5.
44. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.

40.

More importantly, imperfections in mechanisms for internalizing and
redirecting social impacts to the shareholder bottom line result in
incentives to "cheat" in the short-run in order to improve shareholders'
short-term return. These actions in turn impose social costs that may, in
the long-run, result in the imposition of more rigid legal and regulatory
controls, which may more than offset the short-term gains to cheaters
and harm all market participants in the process.45 Even financier George
Soros, who has earned hundreds of millions of dollars managing hedge
funds to buy securities, currencies, and derivative investments, warns
that "the untrammeled intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the
spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our open and
'
democratic society."46
These incentives to cheat are all the more powerful in the modern
industrial corporation, which not only separates decision-making power
from the full economic consequences of the firm's decisions, but also
insulates shareholders from accountability for the consequences of those
decisions. The sole proprietor of a hog feed lot will, in all probability,
control its odors and contain its effluent so that both his or her appetite
and drinking water are protected. The corporate manager is unlikely
even to consult his or her shareholders, who in all probability live

thousands of miles away.

Moreover, because they can remain

anonymous, shareholders are less likely to care so much either. At most,
the decision is likely to directly affect only a small minority of the firm's
owners.
B. Economic Efficiency and Information
The efficiency, fairness, and practicality arguments also assume that
all material information is freely available in the market place. This
assumption is essential because efficient choice requires timely and
correct information regarding tastes, technologies, and resources.
Information, however, is neither free nor necessarily available.
Moreover, the corporate form changes the availability and impact of

45. See supra note 42. As Berkeley Professor Edwin Epstein stated, "being ethical
heads off the law." Andrew Stark, What's the Matter with Business Ethics?, HARV. Bus.

REV., May-June 1993, at 38, 39. The advent of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) are
examples of the consequences of firms not adequately considering other constituencies.
As David Grier of the Royal Bank of Canada noted in 1989, "I do believe the community
eventually catches up to the bad guys." David Grier, Speech (Sept. 19, 1989), quoted in
HENRY EHRLICH, THE WILEY BOOK OF BusINEss QUOTATIONS 146 (1998).
46. George Soros, The CapitalistThreat, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45.
47.

See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 26.
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information in several ways.
Because people are highly social, much of their behavior is mediated
by social expectations, both in the short and long run. Indeed, although
there is evidence that some behaviors are "hard wired," much of an
individual's ethos is socially inculcated, and to some degree is socially

plastic, or subject to change due to social pressures. 8 An individual is
most comfortable when operating within a social situation that is
congruent with his or her internal value system, but can tolerate minor
excursions from that situation. 49 Similarly, most individuals can tolerate
minor discrepancies between their behavior and social expectations."
Ultimately, however, an individual who is aware that his or her behavior
does not comport with social expectations becomes extraordinarily
uncomfortable and must act to reduce that distress, either by modifying
the behavior, withdrawing from the situation, or deploying some other
psychological mechanism such as denial or rationalization.'
The influence of social situations has been found to be enormously
important in the interpretation of information, with significant
differences in behavior induced by the introduction of either neutral or
biased participants in a setting requiring action.52 In the context of
market transactions among individuals, or even large organizations with
identifiable owners, these social phenomena tend to create substantial
safeguards against attempts to internalize gains while externalizing
costs. People who persist in dumping their garbage in others' living
rooms will experience a variety of social consequences, ranging from
subtle suggestion to social ostracism, if not outright retaliation. The
absentee and anonymous shareholder has little likelihood of
experiencing such influences. Thus, important information is denied
owners of corporations because of their social distance from the harm.
This problem is even more acute when investments are made in remote
countries far away from the investors' direct knowledge.
This social distance also affects how corporate managers receive,
construe, and act upon information. In the Ford "Pinto" case, for
example, managers made a decision about whether to produce the
vehicles without safety modifications based on written estimates
48. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 27-58 (1991).
49. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNmrvE DISSONANCE 188-96 (1957).
50.
51.
52.

See id.
Seeid. at264-65,271.
See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 48, at 27-58.

presented by engineers and accountants.53 Together, they construed the
situation as one requiring a classic cost-benefit analysis;' this led to the

only "sensible" decision-not to make a four to eight dollar alteration.55
Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash
testing program, testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the
decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas
tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds creating a
significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that "fixes" were
feasible at nominal cost. He testified that management's decision was based
on
'56
the cost savings which would inure from omitting or delaying the "fixes.

Had the social environment been different or the directors been forced
to think about the broader impact of their decision, other factors might

have been considered. Such factors include: what would be the moral or
ethical thing to do in light of the impact their decision would have on the
individuals who would surely die and the toll on their families; the
damage to Ford's reputation;57 and the legitimacy of American

corporations.
Ford's desire to increase its bottom line at the expense of the
consumers was made possible by the lack of information that was
available in the market place. Had Ford revealed the design defect to the
public with the cost of remediation, consumers could have made the
choice between a vehicle that was a fiery death trap when rear-ended at
low speeds58 at a price of X dollars, and a vehicle that would withstand

such collisions for X+8 dollars; it is fair to say that consumers would
have paid the extra eight dollars.59
53. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361-62 (Ct. App. 1981).
Similarly, in July 1999, a Los Angeles jury ordered General Motors (GM) to pay $4.8
billion in punitive damages and $107.8 million in compensatory damages to six people
who were burned in 1993 when their 1979 Chevrolet Malibu exploded after its fuel tank
was ruptured in a rear-end crash. See Jeffrey Ball & Milo Geyelin, GM Orderedby Jury
to Pay $4.9 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1999, at A3. A memo written by a GM
engineer in 1973 estimated that each burn death from a fuel-related fire in a GM vehicle
cost the company $200,000, or $2.40 for every GM vehicle then on the U.S. roads, but
noted that "a human fatality is really beyond value, subjectively." Id. Following the
decision, one of the jurors asserted, "It was a business decision that [GM] made to go
ahead and fight lawsuits from fuel-set fires rather than fixing something that wouldn't
have cost them much at all." Id. (alteration in original).
54. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
55. These were the estimates of Ford's engineers. See id. at 361. Plaintiffs'
experts estimated the costs of alterations to be anywhere from $1.80 to $15.30,
depending on the methods used. See id.
56. Id. at 361.
57. A study found that the drop in shareholder wealth accompanying drug and
automobile recalls was much greater than the direct costs of the recall, including
expenses for public relations. See Cornell & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 13.
58. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
59. Ford may also have been on firmer ground had it argued that it made a tradeoff
between safety and price, which are both benefits to the consumer. It was clear from the
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Some firms have attempted to design mechanisms to provide
information about the integrity of the other party to a transaction to
ensure that one's reputation is adversely affected by inappropriate
behavior. For example, eBay, the leading Internet auction company, has
set up a method for buyers to provide feedback regarding sellers to other
potential buyers. eBay's "Tips for buyers" state:
If you see a number in parentheses next to a seller's UserID, that number is
the seller's feedback rating. This rating is a summary of the comments that
other users have made about this user. You can click on that number to take
you to the actual comments, [sic] people have left about this user. It is a good
6
idea to get to know a person's reputation, especially before you send money. 0

This type of formal mechanism for feedback is rare in the corporate
world, however.

C. ShareholderPreferences
Implicit in the arguments in favor of a standard of maximization of
shareholder value is the assumption that shareholders are willing and
able to evaluate what the corporation is doing. If the corporation's
actions do not comport with the shareholder's personal ethics, the
shareholder can take the "Wall Street Wak"-sell that company's stock
and buy stock in a company that better exemplifies the shareholder's
ethical values.
However, this approach is unsatisfactory and generally unworkable for
several reasons. First, it assumes that shareholders are provided with
sufficient information regarding the corporation's decisions affecting
other constituencies, which is not currently legally required. Second, it
is not economically efficient for a shareholder with a small stake in a
number of companies to do the sort of due diligence and research
necessary to make an informed judgment about whether each company
in the portfolio is acting in a socially responsible manner. Third, with
the surge in 40 1(k) retirement plans and investments in mutual funds, an
individual shareholder may have little or no control over which
companies the plan fiduciary or fund manager selects for the portfolio.6'
evidence, however, that Ford made a tradeoff between safety and its own bottom line,
with no thought as to the ramifications for the consumer.
60. eBay Tips for Buyers (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:llpages.ebay.comlaw/tipsbuy.html>.
61. See Nell Minow, Value and Values: Whom Should CorporationsServe?, in
RESPONSiVE CoMMuNrry 39, 42 (1996). Some retirement plans permit employees to

Fourth, fund managers of pension funds subject to the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 197462 may be legally constrained to
make decisions that maximize the return for plan beneficiaries, even if
the beneficiaries themselves might (had they been asked) prefer more

socially responsible investments. Thus, for example, a fund manager
may not vote the plan's shares in favor of a shareholder proposal to stop
doing business in countries using slave or prison labor, both because of

the fear that the proposed action might adversely affect corporate profits
and shareholder return, and because the fund manager does not know
(and has no way to ascertain) what the plan beneficiaries would prefer.63
Friedman assumes that it will be the desire of the corporate owners or

their representatives to make as much money as possible, while
conforming to law and ethical custom. 6"

This is offered as dictum

without entertaining the possibility either that corporate owners may
wish to make as much money as possible without regard for law or
ethical custom (the "robber baron" model)," or that they may instead
prefer profit "sufficiency" rather than maximization (the Ben and Jerry's
model). 66
A fifth problem also exists. Many institutional investors (such as
California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS")) may
have invested in accordance with a stock index (such as the S&P 500)

and thus be incapable of taking the Wall Street Walk. Or a fund may
own so many shares of an individual company that it cannot liquidate
elect to have plan contributions invested in so-called "socially responsible" or "green"
funds. But such funds often utilize very gross criteria for determining what is socially
responsible that may be both over and under inclusive (e.g., sale of tobacco products or
use of nuclear power). They may not exclude companies with far more subtle social
responsibility issues, and they may exclude companies that are responsible members of
an essential yet unpopular industry, such as oil and gas production. See, e.g., Paul
Farrow, Family Finance: Don't Be Green About Ethical Investment, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), June 13, 1999, at 14. A Web site sponsored by the Council on
Economic Priorities provides shareholders with ratings about 320 public companies'
records on certain social issues. See Council on Economic Priorities(visited Nov. 11,
1999) <http://cepnyc.org>.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1381 (1994 &Supp. I1 1997).
63. The Internet may provide a cheap and easy way to obtain more information
regarding beneficiaries' preferences. For example, the Shareholder Activism Center is a
new Web site developed by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, a coalition
of more than 200 religious institutional investors. The site provides investors and others
a forum for sharing their views on more than 200 shareholder resolutions involving
social issues and such topics as the environment and corporate accountability. See
ShareholderActivism Center(visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.socialfunds.com>.
64. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 33.
65. See Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law, 28 J.
MARSHALL

66.

L. REv. 827, 833 (1995).

See, e.g., MARY SCOTr

& HOWARD RoTHMAN,

COMPANIES

WITH A

CONSCIENCE: INTIMATE PORTRArrS OF TWELVE FIRMS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE

(1992).

46-61
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the position without driving down the stock price and thereby reducing
the overall return on investment.67
D. FirstDo No Harm
Friedman primarily discusses vague social goods as advocated by
undefined constituencies. This Article agrees with Friedman that it is

not reasonable, or necessarily socially beneficial, for directors to mount
their white chargers and engage in battle against general social woes.
This was the message of Dodge v. FordMotor Co.,6 in which the court
distinguished between "an incidental humanitarian expenditure of
corporate funds for the benefit of the employ[ee]s, like the building of a
hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the betterment
of their condition" (a permissible use of corporate funds), and a "general
purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of others" (an
impermissible use).6
However, even Adam Smith, long-revered
proponent of the "invisible hand" and laissez-faire policies, argued only

that "self-interested behavior may result in socially desirable outcomes if
it is moderated by self-control and socially responsible adherence to
other social rules and codes of behavior (Smith's 'self-command' and

'sense of duty')."'

Indeed, Smith's first major work, The Theory of

67. These dynamics prompted large pension funds, such as CalPERS, to try to
improve performance by pressuring the independent directors to fire non-performing
Chief Executive Officers (as happened at GM, American Express, Westinghouse, and
International Business Machines). See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & DAVID J. BERGER,
PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE CONTROL: STRATEGIC CONSmERATIONS A-27 (Bureau
of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Corporate Practice Series Portfolio No. 69, 1997).
68. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
69. Id. at 684. The court asserted that a "business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders," and ruled that "it is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation
for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of
benefiting others." Id. As shown infra Part III, however, to the extent that Dodge is read
to preclude consideration of adverse effects of corporate actions on nonshareholder
constituencies, Dodge is not in accord with modem jurisprudence.
70. Mathew B. Forstater, Adam Smith Ain't No Gordon Gekko (visited Nov. 10,
1999) <http://econwpa.wustl. edu/-tchecndglarchivel1995/2650.html>; see Soros, supra
note46, at S1. Soros stated:
Adam Smith himself combined a moral philosophy with his economic theory.
Beneath the individual preferences that found expression in market behavior,
people were guided by a set of moral principles that found expression in
behavior outside the scope of the market mechanism. Deeply rooted in
tradition, religion, and culture, these principles were not necessarily rational in
the sense of representing conscious choices among available alternatives.

Moral Sentiments, laid out the institutional framework necessary for a
"society of perfect liberty" advocated in The Wealth of Nations.1
Just as Smith assumed the existence of responsibilities and duties
embedded in an institutional framework, this Article contends that

directors have a duty to consider the cadre of well-defined constituencies
whose existence and interests are inextricably intertwined with the
corporation. In particular, this Article concurs with Richard Nunan's

assertion that corporations have a minimal moral obligation to avoid
creating social injury and to correct 2any past social injuries for which

they can be held directly responsible.
Edward Simon, president of Herman Miller, goes even further, stating,

"Why can't we do good works at work? ....Business is the only
institution that has a chance, as far as I can see, to fundamentally
improve the injustice that exists in the world."
Indeed, this Article argues that firms seriously considering ways to
minimize the adverse effects of their decisions on other constituencies

often can do so without requiring significant sacrifice by their
shareholders. In a multi-billion dollar transaction, such as the Safeway
LBO, the marginal cost (as a percentage of the deal and its expected
returns to investors) of giving employees more generous severance

might have been relatively small, yet its effect on the workers who were
laid off could have been the difference between being able to make ends
meet and not.
E. The False Dichotomy Between Social Responsibility and
ShareholderValue

The arguments for maximization of shareholder value also assume that
there is an inherent conflict between shareholder value and social
responsibility. Friedman, for example, suggests that it approaches fraud
Id.

71. Forstater, supra note 70. As Sylvia Nassar wrote in the New York Times,
"Adam Smith Ain't No Gordon Gekko." Sylvia Nasar, Defending the Father of

Economics: Adam Smith Was No Gordon Gekko, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1994, at 6E.

Gekko was a ruthless securities trader in the film Wall Street who asserted that "greed is
good." Id.
72. See generally Richard Nunan, The Libertarian Conception of Corporate
Property: A Critique of Milton Friedman's View on the Social Responsibility of
Business, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 891 (1988); see also Ira M. Millstein, The Responsible Board,

52 Bus. LAw. 407 (1997), in which Millstein argues that the "polestar" for board
responsibility is enhancing shareholder value, but a board is properly concerned with
"extrinsics" or negative effects on nonshareholder constituencies. For example, he
suggests that even if a board concludes that employee layoffs are necessary to enhance
shareholder value, the board should try to make them as painless as possible. See id. at
413-14.
73. SENGE, supra note 7, at 5.
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to call profit-maximizing behavior "socially responsible." 74 Indeed,

some ethicists argue that a firm may not properly characterize any
behavior as ethical or socially responsible if the decision will also, at
least in the long term, maximize shareholder return. 75
This Article rejects the notion that an act is socially responsible only if
it hurts. Rather, it agrees with Ralph Larson, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Johnson & Johnson, who, when asked whether he
would rather be a good corporate citizen or maximize profits, replied,
"Yes. 76 He rejected what he termed the "tyranny of the 'or"' and
refused to treat social responsibility and profit maximization as mutually
exclusive.' Similarly, Gerald Levin, Chairman of Time Warner Inc.,
explained in his letter to shareholders, "These values [diversity, respect,
and integrity] aren't about feeling good.... They're about performing
well.., there is an inseparable link between our values and the value
creation we offer our shareholders. 78
Recent empirical research on the relationship between the social
performance and the financial performance of corporations supports
these views. Lee E. Preston, of the University of Maryland at College
Park, and Douglas P. O'Bannon, of Webster University, analyzed sixtyseven companies that were rated in every corporate reputation survey
conducted by Fortune magazine from 1982 to 1992 and for which the
relevant financial information was available. 9 To arrive at its rankings,
Fortune surveyed several thousand executives, directors, and analysts
covering the largest firms in a number of industries." The Fortune
surveys gathered data on corporate reputation along eight dimensions,
including Community and Environmental Responsibility (CERESP),
Ability to Select and Retain Good People (PEOPLE), and Quality of
Products and Services (PSQ).8 1 Preston and O'Bannon took these three
74. Friedman, supra note 14, at 33.
75. See Stark, supra note 45, at 38-44 (quoting a participant in the symposium "Do
Good Ethics Ensure Good Profits?" sponsored by the Business and Society Review: "To
be ethical as a business because it may increase your profits is to do so for the entirely

wrong reason."). See also Dean Rieck, Balancing Ethics and Profitability, DiRECT
MARKETING, Oct. 1998, at 53, 53-56.

76.

Millstein, supra note 72, at 408-09.

77.

Id.

78. Eben Shapiro, Time Warner Defines, Defends System of Values, WALL ST.
Apr. 9, 1999, atB1.

J.,

79. See Lee E. Preston & Douglas P. O'Bannon, The CorporateSocial-Financial
PerformanceRelationship, 36 Bus. & Soc'Y 419 (1997).
80. See id. at 424.
81. See id.

dimensions to reflect the interest of three important stakeholder groups employees, customers, and the community at large. They tested a
variety of hypotheses by computing correlation coefficients between the

social and financial performance variables, in both contemporaneous and
trailing combinations.

Of the 270 correlations computed, there was not a single significant
negative result.
The evidence suggested "that there is a positive

correlation between social and financial performance in large U.S.
corporations," regardless of the financial performance measure (i.e.,

return on assets, return on equity, return on investment). 3 Thus, the data
were "broadly consistent with the stakeholder theory," which posits that

"favorable social performance is a requirement for business legitimacy

and that social and financial performance tend to be positively associated

over the long-term."

4

The empirical results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence and

ethical theory. For example, a survey by Deloitte Touche found that
sixty-three percent of the respondents believed that high ethical
standards strengthen a business's competitive position.5 Many of the

Fortune 1000 corporations have formalized corporate ethics activities.86
Harvard Business School Professor Lynn Sharp Paine argues that
82. See id. at 426; see also JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HuMAN EQUATION: BUILDING
PROFrrs BY PurnNG PEOPLE FIRST 32, 64-65 (1998) (stating that "[s]ubstantial gains, on

the order of 40 percent or so in most of the studies reviewed, can be obtained by
implementing high performance management practices" including employment security,
self-managed teams and decentralized decision-making, and comparatively high
compensation contingent on organizational performance).
83. Preston & O'Bannon, supra note 79, at 426.
84. Id. at 428. Prior studies had reached varying results. See, e.g., Phillip Cochran

& Robert A. Wood, CorporateSocial Responsibility and Financial Performance, 27

ACAD. MGmT. J.42 (1984) (finding positive relationship between social and financial
performance); Barbara A. Spencer & G. Stephen Taylor, A Within and Between Analysis
of the Relationship Between

Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial

Performance, 18 AKRON BUS. & ECON. REv.7 (1985) (same); Kenneth Aupperle et al.,

An EmpiricalExamination of the Relationship Between CorporateSocial Responsibility
and Profitability,28 AcAD. MGMT. J.446 (1985) (finding no relationship between social
and financial performance); Kenneth Aupperle & Dean Van Pham, An Expanded

Investigation in the Relationship of CorporateSocial Responsibility and Firm Financial

Performance,2 EMPL. RESPONS. & RIGHTS 2. 263 (1989) (same); Jean B. McGuire, et al.,
CorporateSocial Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance,31 AcAD. MGMT. J.
854 (1988) (mixed results).
85. See ToucHE Ross AND Co., ETmcs IN AMERICAN BusINEsS: A SPECIAL REPORT
(1988). See also Good Tales on Greed, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1990, at 71.
86. See generally Gary R. Weaver et al., CorporateEthics Practices in the Mid1990's: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J.Bus. ETHics 283 (1999) (stating
that 98% of the firms have ethics-oriented policy statements; 30% have a specific office
or department to deal with ethics issues; and 51% have telephone-based compliance
reporting/advice systems). See also Gael McDonald, Business Ethics: Practical
Proposalsfor Organizations,19 J.Bus. ETHIcs 143 (1999).
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creating an organization that encompasses exemplary conduct may be
the best way to prevent damaging misconduct.8 Directors have a critical
role to play in creating ethical organizations." Yet their adoption of a

code of ethics will mean nothing to managers if the board shows a lack

of respect for the effect of its decisions on others. 9
This Article asserts that boards should be encouraged to search for
opportunities to conduct their affairs in ways that both are fair to all
constituencies and generate the maximum return to investors. Shell Oil,

for example, is taking special care to avoid harming the vulnerable
Amazon rain forest as it proceeds with its three billion dollar, forty-year
natural gas project in Camisea, Peru. 90 While Shell Oil's management

may have been motivated by a desire to prevent political backlash and
opposition,9" its actions will still help protect the environment and the
indigenous population. As such, Shell Oil is acting responsibly and
deserves credit for doing so.
Perhaps the most frequently cited example of the positive public
relations benefits that can accrue from ethical and socially responsible
behavior is the recall of thirty million bottles of Tylenol by Johnson &
Johnson in 1982, after several people died subsequent to taking Tylenol
capsules that were tampered with and laced with cyanide poison." The

recall cost Johnson & Johnson approximately one-hundred million
87. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for OrganizationalIntegrity, HARv. Bus.
REV. Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 117.
88. See Timothy B. Bell & Lawrence A. Poneman, The Role of Corporate
Directors in the Business Ethics Process, NACD Governance Series, ETHICS AND THE
BOARDROOM, 1996, at 5. Also, "The influence supervisors have on subordinates may
stem from the supervisor's role in establishing the ethical climate of the workgroup, his
or her control over subordinates, and the supervisor's own ethical behavior." James C.
Wimbush, The Effect of Cognitive Moral Development and Supervisory Influence on
Subordinates' EthicalBehavior, 18 J. Bus. ETHIcs 383, 384 (1999). "If you have a CEO
who says 'get results no matter how,' you'll promote fudging numbers," says Indiana
University Professor Michael Metzger. Carol Hymowitz, CEOs Set the Tone for How to
Handle Questions of Ethics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1998, at B1.
89. According to Metzger, "It's what you do, not say, that counts." Hymowitz,
supra note 88, at B1.
90. See Jonathon Friedland, Oil CompaniesStrive to Turn a New Leaf to Save Rain
Forest,WALL ST. J., July 17, 1997, at Al.
91. Thomas Lovejoy, a Smithsonian scientist and rain-forest expert, states that big
companies are finally realizing "that if you do things right from the start, it will save you
a lot of money and a lot of grief in the long run." Id.
92. See Michael Waldholz, Johnson & Johnson Defends Emphasis on Long-Term
Growth as Profit Surges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1985, at 8; see also William Power,
Tylenol Maker Must Bear Cost of 1982 Recall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1986, at 1.

dollars.93 Although the short-term economic costs of the recall were
enormous, within two years Johnson & Johnson was able to regain the
market share it had lost. 4 Public relations should not be the
determinative factor in deciding what is socially responsible, but good
public relations resulting from public disclosure of positive corporate
actions can be a carrot to help prompt socially responsible behavior.
Even though boards often can both maximize shareholder value and
be fair to all corporate constituencies, there are times when honesty does
hurt-when a board must do what it believes is morally right even if it
reduces shareholder value. As Dr. Rieux in Albert Camus's The Plague
explained when asked why he was working so hard and putting himself
at risk to stop the plague that had struck his community, "[T]here's no
question of heroism in all this. It's a matter of common decency."'95

For example, Ben & Jerry's continued to pay its dairy producers
above-market rates after prices were reduced due to cutbacks in the
federal dairy purchase program. Co-founder Ben Cohen said, "We
refuse to profit off the misfortune of our dairy suypliers due to some
antiquated, misguided, convoluted federal system."
Peter M. Senge explains that compassion flows naturally from an
understanding of the systems within which people operate:
We are used to [seeing] compassion as an emotional state, based on our
concern for one another. But it is also grounded in a level of awareness. In my
experience, as people see more of the systems within which they operate, and as
they understand more clearly the pressures influencing
one another, they
naturally develop more compassion and empathy. 97

This Article therefore rejects one CEO's argument that he "can't let
[his] own sense of right and wrong get in the way" of doing what is best
for the shareholders.98
F. Common Goods and the Corporation'sDilemma
Individuals and firms that consider only their own self-interests are
susceptible to what some theorists call the common goods problem or
the Prisoner's Dilemma." In essence, firms may select sub-optimal
93. See Power, supranote 92, at 1.
94. See Marc G. Weinberger & Jean B. Romeo, The Impact of Negative Product
News, 32 Bus. HORIZONS 44, 49 (1989).

95.

ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE

163 (Stuart Gilbert trans. 1948).

96. Daniel Seligman, A Test for Bus Drivers, a Socially Responsible Ice Cream,
Competing with the Mob, and Other Matters,FORTUNE, June 3, 1991, at 247.
97. SENGE, supra note 7, at 171.
98. FREEMAN & GILBERT, supra note 3, at 23.
99. See generally AVINASH K. DIxIr & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING
STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BusINEss, PoLITIcs, AND EVERYDAY LFE
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strategies because they fear that any self-sacrifice may be taken
advantage of by another party who reaps the benefit for the sacrifice but
does not pay for it.
Heads of nations, for example, may agree that curtailing fishing in
international waters is necessary to sustain fish habitats for the indefinite

future. However, if there is no binding contract among nations to limit
fishing, the nation whose citizens might prefer to provide sustainability
will be discouraged from doing so if other nations are likely to take
advantage of that self-restraint by not only failing to limit their own
catch, but also catching the incremental amount the socially responsible
nation chose not to take.
Similar issues arise for firms considering investing in infrastructure,
such as new roads to relieve the traffic gridlock caused by commuters to
the firm's facilities or improved educational facilities to train better
workers. If every finn contributed its pro rata share, then private
industry might well be able to finance these improvements at a fraction
of what the government would spend in tax dollars. Yet, even though
every firm would benefit from such investments, no one company will
rationally invest in infrastructure because its competitors will have every
incentive to "free ride" by having its employees use the new roads and
by hiring the better trained workers without contributing to the cost.
Governmental regulation, through restrictions or taxation, is often
necessary to force firms to contribute to payment of the costs of these
actions. But as efforts to privatize prisons and public schools suggest,
the government often does not get the most bang for the buck. It tends
to move slowly, is not nimble, and often imposes enormous transaction
costs (also referred to as "red tape"). The government's solution to toxic
Response,
Environmental
Comprehensive
the
sites,
waste
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 '00 (CERCLA), exemplifies the
inefficiencies that accompany governmental attempts to force firms to
internalize their externalities.' °'

(1991); ANATOLRAPOPORT& ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA:
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1965).

A STUDY

IN

100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
101. See Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Intermediate
Landowners: Reexamining the Liability-BasedApproach, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 337,
345-53 (1997); John H. Cushman, Superfund in Shambles: Indecision Fiscal Gridwork
Taking Toll, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al.

G. Law and Ethical Custom
Friedman's social responsibility argument appears to view both the
law and ethical custom as fixed and readily definable standards of
behavior. This ignores the reality that there is a dynamic and interactive
relationship between economic behavior, law, and social norms that is

inherent in business decisions.

The existence of public relations,

advertising, lobbying, and legal departments in modem corporations is
clear evidence of this interplay.'O A large portion of the resources of

modern corporations is devoted to modifying or maintaining their
operating environments by influencing consumers, legislatures, and the
public at large. Indeed, manipulation of the law by the unscrupulous is a

well recognized phenomenon. Similarly, the influence of corporate
advertising on cultural norms is evident in a comparison of current
popular TV shows with popular shows of the 1950s.'O'
Frederic Bastiat, 19th Century French political economist, noted the
malleability of the law and the dangers of relying on it to provide the

standard of proper conduct:
There is in all of us a strong disposition to believe that anything lawful is also
proper. This belief is so widespread that many persons have erroneously held
that things are 'just' because law makes them so. Thus, in order to make
plunder appear just and sacred to many consciences, it is only necessary for the
law to decree and sanction it. Slavery, controls, and monopoly find defenders
not only among those who profit from them but even among those who suffer
from them.10'

The dynamism of the law is evident not only in shifting legislative
enactments but also in judicial interpretation of those enactments. In

102.

As William W. Cook concluded in his treatise,
It is not remarkable that corporations seek to control government. The
reason why they take part in politics; manipulate caucuses and conventions;
use money, power, and votes in elections; bribe and influence national, State,
and municipal officers, judges, and legislators; and often control States and
cities is plain. Corporations do all this to protect and increase their property.
WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 246-47 (New York, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1891).

103. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of
Childrenand the Parent-ChildRelationship,61 ALB. L. REV. 345 (1997).
104.

DEAN RUSSELL, FREDERIC BASTIAT: IDEAS AND INFLUENCE 5 (2d ed. 1965).

Consider, for example, the Ford Pinto case. There was no precedent under law or
custom for Ford to engage in anything other than a classic cost-benefit analysis. While it
is unclear what the actual financial impact its decision had on its shareholders, Ford
made a very rational calculation and concluded that a few statistically probable deaths
were less expensive than a massive recall. See, e.g., THE FORD PINTO CASE: A STUDY IN
APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY (Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds.,
1994); FRANCIS T. CULLEN Fr AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO
CASE AND BEYOND

(1987).
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1896, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Plessy v. Ferguson'5
that legislative segregation of the races in transportation did not deprive
African Americans of equal protection under the law."0 6 The Court
rejected the argument that segregation stamped "the colored race with a
' Yet 58 years later, the
badge of inferiority."'O
Supreme Court overruled
Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education,'°s unanimously deciding that
"segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opporturities. ' 9
Ultimately, in fact, Friedman's insistence that the only interests that

management can legitimately consider are those that are explicitly set
forth in law and custom is an invitation for more legislation to ensure
that externalities are in fact borne by the corporations that benefit from

them." ° Therefore, what appears to be in the short-term interests of the
corporation's shareholders may in fact be detrimental to the long-term
interests of both those shareholders and other market participants,
inasmuch as legislation often has its own unintended consequences."'
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
106. See id. at 551.
107. Id.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. Id. at 493. Thirty-eight years later, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the role
of precedent and changing societal norms in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). In deciding whether to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its
holding that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy in the early
stages, the Court considered:
[W]hether Roe's central rule has been found unworkable; whether the rule's
limitation on state power could be removed without serious inequity to those
who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society
governed by it; whether the law's growth in the intervening years has left
Roe's central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether
Roe's premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to
render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with
the issue it addressed.
PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 855.
110. Consider the issue of protecting privacy on the Internet. Because of the
inability of the American Internet market to self-regulate, the Federal Trade Commission
has proposed standards for privacy protections. See, e.g., Maria Seminerio, ZDNet:
News: No Change to PrivacyStatus Quo (visited Nov. 9, 1999) <http://www.zdnet.com/
zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2246329-1,00.html>.
Microsoft Corporation responded by
proposing new standards for privacy on-line. See Microsoft Announces Steps to
Strengthen Consumer Privacy Online (visited Nov. 9, 1999) <http://www.microsoft.
com/presspass/press/1999/jun99/ privacypr.html>.
111. See supra note 45.

From a game theory perspective, a perverse incentive to be the first to
exploit an externality before it is denied by law is but one adverse

consequence
of such single-minded criteria for organizational decision2
making."
H. Pragmatismand CorporateGovernance
There is no question that Berle and Means have identified an
important issue in corporate governance-how to minimize irresponsible

management (if not downright opportunism). However, even if it can be
agreed that there is a duty to maximize profits, there is no consensus as
to what that means in practice. Whole curricula in business schools are
dedicated to economic decision-making, including the advantages and
disadvantages of discounted cash flow rate of return for choosing among
different alternative investments, or the strategic advisability of

sacrificing short-term profitability for increased market share or better
relationships with long-term customers and suppliers.
Some have suggested that one escape from this difficulty would be use

of shareholder value (capital appreciation plus dividends) as a measure
of an organization's profitability."3 However, neither the day-to-day
pricing of corporate shares nor share value derived from traditional
accounting methods is consistent with the traditional characteristics of

highly efficient markets."'

Delaware courts, among others, have

continually expressed skepticism over the accuracy of viewing the
trading prices of shares as a reflection of the corporation's "intrinsic
value," and, consequently, the degree to which directors can use those
trading prices as a guide to action."5 To hold directors to a legal
112. For a discussion of the dangers and unethical behaviors caused by a game
theory approach to business, see Robert C. Solomon, Game Theory as a Model for
Business and Business Ethics, 9 Bus. ETHics QTLY.11 (1999).
113. See, e.g., Marc S. Schwarz & Michael V. Ippolito, The Key Gauges of
Perfonnance, DmECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 1995, at 29.
114. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 470-71. See also Stephen F.
Leroy & Richard D. Porter, The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied
Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA 555 (1981) (stating variations in stock prices are

much too large to be explained as responses to changing expectations of future
dividends); Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by
Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 421 (1981) (same); Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Permanentand Temporary Components of Stock Prices,96

J. POL. ECON. 246 (1988).
115. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
n.12 (Del. 1989) ("[Uit is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present
stock market price of shares is not representative of true value .. ");Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985) (stating need for directors to focus on intrinsic
value and rejecting use of trading price); 4 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995) (suggesting possibility of "ignorance or mistaken belief [on
the part of shareholders] regarding the Board's assessment of the long-term value of
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standard of maintaining or increasing shareholder value does not
comport with the realities of the modem economic world, where the
prices of key commodities may fluctuate wildly and entire national
economies may collapse in a matter of weeks.
Moreover, to the extent that managers' salaries, bonuses, and stock
options are tied to short-term performance in an attempt to align
management's interests with those of the shareholders, management may
be induced to take short-term measures that are harmful to other
16
stakeholders, such as employee layoffs, or to long-term shareholders.'
Such actions may have no positive long-term effect on the firm's

profitability but may only boost short-term gains to management."
fI.

LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Thirty states have enacted statutes intended to permit (and, in the case
of Connecticut,"' to require) consideration of other constituencies, even
in connection with a change in control." 9 For example, in an effort to
Unitrin's stock") (quoting Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 290
(Del. Ch. 1989)).
116. Recent studies support the proposition that "top managers consider their own
interests of primary importance, or second only to those of customers, in corporate
decision making." Preston & O'Bannon, supra note 79, at 423.
117. See, e.g., Kevin F. Hallock, Layoffs, Top Executive Pay, and Firm
Performance, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 711 (1998) (stating firms that announce layoffs in the
previous year pay their CEOs more and give their CEOs larger percentage raises than
firms that do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year; moreover,
there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements).

Recognizing this danger of short-termism, CalPERS announced in 1994 its intention to
take into account in its investment decisions how a company treats its employees. A
study by the Gordon Group that found a correlation between corporate results and work
force performance prompted the fund to consider such issues as whether companies offer
employees training programs and give more responsibility to lower-level workers. See
Asra Q. Nomani, CaIPERS Says Its Investment Decisions Will Reflect How Firms Treat
Workers, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A5.
118. Directors of a Connecticut corporation must consider employee interests in the
context of hostile takeovers. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (1997).
119. The states that have other constituency statutes are as follows: Arizona, ARIZ.
REv.STAT. § 10-1202 (1998); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0830 (1998); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1998); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1998); Idaho, IDAHO
CODE §§ 30-1602, 30-1702 (1998); Illinois, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-85 (West 1998);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Michie 1998); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 490.1108,
491.101B (1997); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Michie 1998);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 (West 1998); Maine, ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, § 716 (West 1997); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 20E (Law. Coop. 1999); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §
79-4-8.30 (1998); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.347 (1997); Nebraska, NEB. REV.

thwart a hostile takeover bid by the Belzbergs of Canada for Armstrong,
a major Pennsylvania employer, the Pennsylvania legislature amended
the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law in 1990 to, inter alia, permit

directors to consider the "effects of any action upon any or all groups
affected by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in
which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located."'"
The board is not required to regard any corporate interest or the interests
of any particular groups as a dominant or controlling interest or factor.12'
The American Bar Association's Corporate Director's Guidebook

summarizes a corporate director's responsibilities as follows:
Stated broadly, the principal responsibility of a corporate director is to
promote the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders in directing the
corporation's business and affairs.
In so doing, the director should give primary consideration to long-term
economic objectives. However, a director should also be concerned that the
STAT. § 21-2432 (1998); Nevada, NEv.REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.138 (Michie 1999); New
Jersey, N.J. REv.STAT. § 14A:10A-2 (1999); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35
(Michie 1998); New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (Consol. 1998); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1999); Ohio, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (West
1998); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 60.357 (1997); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1715 (1998); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1998); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michie 1999); Tennessee, TENN.CODE ANN. § 48-103-202
(1999); Texas, Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 13.06 (West 1999); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. I1A, § 8.30 (1998); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1998);
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 180.0827 (1997); Wyoming, WYO.STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830
(Michie 1999).
The "other constituency" provisions of Arizona, Texas and Virginia may be
characterized as weak. The Texas statute merely states that
[i]n discharging the duties of director under this Act or otherwise, a director, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, may consider the long-term as
well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
including the possibility that those interests may be best served by the

continued independence of the corporation.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 13.06 (West 1999). Similarly, the Virginia statute
states that
[e]xcept as expressly provided in this article, the provisions of this article shall
not limit actions that may be taken, or require the taking of any action, by the
board of directors or shareholders with respect to any potential change in
control of the corporation. With respect to any action or any failure to act by
the board of directors, the provisions of § 13.1-690 shall apply. In determining
the best interests of the corporation, a director may consider the possibility that
those interests may best be served by the continued independence of the
corporation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1999).
120. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 1998).
121. See id. § 1715(b); see also AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., Nos. 98-4058, 984109, 98-4405, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15617, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998) (holding
directors of a Pennsylvania corporation owe a fiduciary duty solely to the corporation
and have no specific duty to shareholders above or beyond those owed to other
constituencies).
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corporation conducts its affairs with due appreciation of public expectations,
taking into consideration trends in the law and ethical standards. Furthermore,
pursuit of the corporation's economic objectives may include consideration of
the effect of corporate policies and operations upon the corporation's
employees, the public, and the environment. 12

The American Law Institute's (ALI) Project on Principles of
Corporate Governance echoes these standards. It states as a general rule

that "a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder

gain."'2' Nevertheless, "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain
are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its

business... [m]ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."'2 The
comment to the ALI principle elaborates:
It is now widely accepted that the corporation should at least consider the social
impact of its activities, so as to be aware of the social costs those activities
entail. By implication, the corporation should be permitted to take such costs
into account, within reason. For example, the corporation may take into
account, within reason, public-welfare concerns relevant to groups with whom
the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees, customers,
suppliers, and members of the communities within which the corporation
operates.'?

The Business Roundtable, an association of the chief executive
officers of leading U.S. corporations with a combined workforce of more
than ten million employees in the United States, officially acknowledges
the importance of considering nonshareholder constituencies:
There has been much debate in corporate governance literature about the parties
to whom directors owe a duty of loyalty and in whose interest the corporation
should be managed. Some say corporations should be managed purely in the
interests of stockholders or, more precisely, in the interests of its present and

122.
1994).
123.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 5 (2d ed.
1

AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

§ 2.01(a) (1994).

The comment notes that
"reasonableness" is to be determined by considering factors such as:
the customary level at which resources are devoted to such purposes among
comparable corporations in proportion to earnings and assets, and the strength
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

of the nexus between the use of corporate resources and the corporation's

business. In general, the greater the amount of corporate resources that are

expended, the stronger should be the nexus.
Id. § 2.01 cmt. i.
124. Id. § 2.01(b)(3).
125. Id. § 2.01 cmt. i.

future stockholders over the long-term. Others claim that directors should also
take into account the interests of other "stakeholders" such as employees,
customers, suppliers, creditors and the community.
The Business Roundtable does not view these two positions as being in
conflict, but it sees a need for clarification of the relationship between these two
perspectives. It is in the long-term interests of stockholders for a corporation to
treat its employees well, to serve its customers well, to encourage its suppliers
to continue to supply it, to honor its debts, and to have a reputation for civic
responsibility. Thus, to manage the corporation in the long-term interests of the
stockholders, management and the board of directors
must take into account the
126
interests of the corporation's other stakeholders.

The ABA guidelines, the ALI principles, and the Business Roundtable
statement are simply operative restatements of modem jurisprudence on
the duties of directors with respect to shareholders and other

constituencies even in jurisdictions, such as Delaware, with no
constituency statute. This jurisprudence states that generally, informed
decisions of directors will not be second-guessed by the courts under the

business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a "presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on

an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."' 27 The presumption

can be overturned only if a plaintiff can show that a majority of the directors
expected to derive personal financial benefit from the transaction, that they
lacked independence, that they were grossly negligent in failing to inform
themselves, or that the decision of the Board was so irrational that it could not
have been the reasonable exercise of the business judgment of the Board.' 28

Under the business judgment rule, "legitimate concerns for
[management's] past conduct of the enterprise and its requirements need
not be left to the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of corporate control
in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers."'29 The Supreme
Court of Delaware has gone further, stating that a board has a duty to
consider these other factors. Thus, in Citron v. Fairchild Camera and

126. BusiNEss ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Sept.
1997). Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's blue
ribbon report on international standards of corporate governance states that "it is more
and more accepted that the corporate objective of maximizing shareholders' value
requires not only superior competitive performance but also responsiveness to the
demands and expectations of employees, local constituencies, and other stakeholders."
OECD REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1998).
127. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
128. Sullivan v. Hammer, No. CIV. A. No. 10823, 1990 WL 114223, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 7, 1990).
129. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009,
1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989), affd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); Keyser v.
Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1130, 1148 n.34 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
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Instrument Corp.,3 ° the Delaware Supreme Court held:
The Fairchild board, actively led by its outside independent directors, had a
right, indeed a firn duty, to consider a host of factors in determining whether to
entertain Gould's offer. As we have recently said: "Circumstances may dictate
that an offer be rebuffed, given the nature and timing of the offer; its legality,
feasibility and effect on the corporation and the stockholders; the alternatives
available and their effect on the various constituencies, particularly the
stockholders; the company's long term strategic plans; and any special factors
bearing on stockholder and public interests.''

Among Fairchild's concerns over the Gould offer were: (1) the
inadequacy of the offer; (2) Gould's reputation and the likely result that
employees would leave the organization; and (3) the probability that
Gould's takeover would have an adverse effect on Fairchild's customers
and suppliers.'32 The court characterized Fairchild's concerns as "classic
factors upon which a board33 may base a proper business decision to

accept or reject a proposal."'

However, because of the "omnipresent spectre" that a board adopting
a defensive measure designed to thwart a hostile bid may be acting to

entrench itself in office, the Supreme Court in Delaware, where a
majority of major publicly traded corporations are domiciled,'34 now
imposes a two-tier proportionality test.' The directors first must show

that they had reasonable grounds for believing that there was a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness.' 36 Then they must demonstrate that
the defensive measures adopted in response to the threat were reasonable
in relation to the threat. 37

In making these determinations, the board must analyze "the nature of
130.

569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).

131. Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989)).
132. See id. at 66-67.
133. Id. at 67.
134. A state Web site proclaims:
More than 295,000 companies are incorporated in Delaware including 60
percent of the Fortune 500 and 50 percent of the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. The Delaware Corporation Law, the Court of
Chancery, and the customer service-oriented staff at the Division of
Corporations are all sound reasons why Delaware leads the nation as a major
corporate domicile.
Delaware Division of Corporations (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http:llwww.state.de.us/

corp/index.htm>.
135. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
136.
137.

See id.
See id.

the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise."'38 In doing
so, the directors may consider, among other things, "the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)."'39 Directors
are further authorized "to make decisions that are expected to promote
corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share
value can be expected to be negatively affected, and thus directors in
pursuit of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to
the claims of other 'corporate constituencies.'".4
There are limits to this discretion, however. In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,41 the Delaware Supreme Court
held that "[a] board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders."' 42 Consideration of nonstockholder interests "is inappropriate" when break-up of the corporation
is "inevitable.' 43 Once the board decides to sell the company, the
directors' role changes from being "defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company."'" As auctioneers, the directors have an obligation
of acting reasonably to seek the transaction offering "the best value
reasonably available to the stockholders.'' 45
This exception to the ability to consider other constituencies is very
narrow and has been applied only in the following three situations:
(1)"when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself
or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the

138. Id.
139. Id. This discretion to consider the impact of corporate decision on
nonshareholders is also evident in language discussing the importance of indemnifying

officers and directors:
Delaware's corporation code authorizes liberal indemnification provisions for
officers and directors of its corporations for sound policy reasons that benefit
all of a corporation's constituencies.... Shareholder democracies want
directors and officers to engage in broadly based decision making in order to
enhance shareholder value by encouraging prudent risk taking to their and the
other corporate constituencies' advantage.
Scharf v. Edgcomb Corp., No. 15224, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 169, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec.

2, 1997).

140. TW Services, Inc. v. Crown, No. CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (footnote omitted).
141. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

142. Id. at 182.
143. Id.
144. Id.

145. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49
(Del. 1994); see also Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055
(Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that in a change-of-control situation, the board is required "to act
reasonably to maximize current, not some future, value").
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company," (2) "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-up of
the company," or (3) when approval of a transaction results in a "sale or change
of control." In the latter situation, there is no "sale or change in control" when
"'[c]ontrol of both' 4 6[companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.""

In cases where a takeover is not inevitable, the business judgment rule
applies and,
[c]ircumstances may dictate that an offer be rebuffed, given the nature and
timing of the offer; its legality, feasibility and effect on the corporation and the
stockholders; the alternatives available and their effect on the various
constituencies, particularly the stockholders; the company's long term strategic
plans; and any special factors bearing on stockholder and public interests. 147

Thus, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 4 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the Time Inc. board had not put Time
up for sale when it agreed to a stock-for-stock merger with Warner
Communications, whereby the former shareholders of Warner would
control sixty-two percent of the new combined entity. 49 Because both
corporations were owned by a "fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
shareholders," dissolution of the Time corporate entity was not
inevitable.5 0 As a result, the Time directors were not required to
"abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term
shareholder profit' 5 ' and could rebuff a hostile takeover offer by
to preserve Time's "culture" of "editorial integrity."'52 The

Paramount

court upheld the Time directors' exercise of business judgment even
though the holders of a majority of the Time stock preferred the
Paramount offer. 3 In contrast, in a subsequent case, the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that Paramount's agreement to merge with Viacom
did constitute a change of control because more than ninety percent of
Viacom's stock was held by a single person, Sumner Redstone.' As a
146. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994), aff'd,
678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
147. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del.
1989) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-56 (Del. 1985)).
148. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
149. See id. at 1145-46.
150. Id. at 1150.
151. Id. at 1154.
152. Id. at 1152.
153. See id. at 1142.
154. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 38
(Del. 1994).

result, the Paramount board had a duty to negotiate with hostile bidder

QVC to get the best price available for its shareholders.'55

Delaware developed its jurisprudence on other constituencies as a
common-law reaction to the "takeover boom" of the 1980s.'56 The
courts in several other states have similarly held that directors have a

common-law right to consider other constituencies.'57 For example, in

155. See id. at 49.
156. See Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time": A Radical Corporate
Vision, 46 Bus. LAW. 377, 384-86 (1990).
157. In Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1965), the plaintiff-minority
shareholders called into question a real estate transaction entered into by some of the
directors on behalf of the Irvine Company (a nonprofit charitable corporation), whereby
the company exchanged land suitable for residential development for agricultural land in
another county. See id. at 396. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants
knowingly and willfully engineered a disposition of assets of the corporation to
some favored persons, including respondent Long-an officer of the
corporation-under terms and conditions less favorable than respondents knew
could have been obtained from others and upon terms and conditions violative
of the best interests and welfare of the corporation.
Id. at 408. In finding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to permit the
appellant-plaintiffs to amend their complaint, the court stated that "[tihere is nothing to
show that the decision to sell these parcels rather than to hold them for lease was other
than a question of business judgment." Id. at 409. Burt v. Irvine Co. is cited for the
proposition that "[c]ourts have properly decided to give directors a wide latitude in the
management of the affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment, and that
means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them." Id. at 408
(quoting Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944)).
In the context of a dispute between minority and majority shareholders, the California
Court of Appeals stated that

[a] director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group
of stockholders.... Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the
corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only
to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.
Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1964) (quoting Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)). The court did not further expound on what is
included in "those interested therein," and the focus of the decision was on the
consideration of the minority shareholders' claim against the majority. Other courts
have also used this language, noting that "[tihe rule that has developed in California is a
comprehensive rule of 'inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein."' Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 472 (Cal. 1969)
(quoting Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952)).
The New York Court of Appeals stated in Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 100 N.E. 721
(N.Y. 1912):
[The acts of directors of a corporation] within the powers of the corporation, in
the lawful and legitimate furtherance of its purposes, in good faith and the
exercise of honest judgment, are valid and conclude the corporation and the
stockholders. Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or
action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to
advance corporate interests, are left solely to their honest and unselfish
decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint,
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and the exercise of them for the common and general interests of the
corporation may not be questioned, although the results show that what they
did was unwise or inexpedient.
Id. at 723-24.
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), the
Second Circuit held that the New York business judgment rule protected directors acting
in good faith and exercising honest judgment unless the duty of care was so "shallow in
execution" or so half-heartedly exercised so as to constitute a "sham." Id. at 274. In this
regard, directors must be found to act with "reasonable diligence" and "due care." Id.
Section 7015 of the New York Banking Law has been applied in the context of a
potential bank merger. See Minzer v. Keegan, No. CV-97-4077(CPS), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16445, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997). Shareholders of The Greater New
York Savings Bank (GNYSB) sued to enjoin a merger between GNYSB and Astoria
Financial Corporation (AFC). The shareholders accused the GNYSB board of failing to
meet its fiduciary obligations to its shareholders by approving the merger with AFC and
rebuffing a bid by North Fork Bancorporation (NFB). Keegan, the Chairman of the
Board of GNYSB, explained to the NFB his concern regarding NFB's apparent
insensitivity to the community. See id. at *2-6. The plaintiffs asserted that the directors
were obliged "to seek transactions offering the best value to shareholders reasonably
available." Id. at *31. The court disagreed, stating that "[a] New York statute provides
instead that in actions involving change of control, the directors of banks are free to
consider not only short-term considerations such as merger price, but long-term factors

as well." Id. at *31 (citing N.Y. BANKING LAW § 7015(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997-98)).
In holding that GNYSB did not breach its fiduciary duty, the court first noted that
"there is nothing in the record that suggests that The Greater was up for auction." Id. at
*34. The court then went on to explain:
Mr. Keegan credibly testified that he feels that "the combination between
The Greater and Astoria is a terrific combination." The two banks have
branches in complementary but not overlapping locations and "have the same
strategic focus on the customer and the ethnic communities in both Queens and
Brooklyn and some parts of Long Island." North Fork, on the other hand, is
perceived by Keegan (and, perhaps, by some portion of the press) as having a
"very direct approach to fee generation and service expansion, and sometimes
the community focus suffers because of that." The question, then, is whether it
is a valid business judgment for The Greater to believe that it will succeed
better at banking in the melting pot of New York City if it joins forces with
another market bank that does not care whether money is deposited in English
or Chinese than if it merges with a more one size fits all institution. This Court
finds that plaintiffs are not likely to convince a trier of fact that The Greater's
decision to prefer a community-oriented bank was so beyond the pale of
corporate decision-making as to be an invalid business judgment.
Id. at *34-35 (citations omitted).
Section 7015 of the New York Banking Law was also cited in a bankruptcy case
where the trustee of an estate being auctioned sold a controlling interest of Olympian
Bank to Olympian Holdings, LLC. See In re Bakalis, 220 B.R. 525 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1998). A rival bidder objected to the proposed sale. In approving the trustee's sale of
the bank to Olympian Holdings, the court found that "[t]he Trustee carefully weighed the
competing bids rather than mechanistically recommending the facially higher bid." Id. at
532. The court quoted section 7015(2) of the New York Banking Law and continued to
note that "Olympian Bank is a well run, profitable banking institution, experiencing
growth, providing jobs, rendering services to its customers, and contributing to the
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A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,'58 the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the power of a corporation to transfer funds to charity.'59

In response to stockholders challenging a 1951 board resolution
authorizing the company to transfer $1500 to Princeton University,'60 the

corporation instituted a declaratory judgment action.

The court

interpreted the implied or incidental powers of a corporation in light of
changing social and economic conditions and upheld the transfer on both
statutory and common law grounds. 6' The court reasoned:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals
they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely for
charitable purposes. With the transfer of... wealth to corporate hands and the
imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to
keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with
justification, turned to corporations to assume62the modem obligations of good
citizenship in the same manner as humans do.'

The court ultimately approved the transfer because it produced a
benefit for the corporation by preserving the "free enterprise system,"

reasoning that the "salvation [of corporations] rests upon [a] sound
economic and social environment which in turn rests in no insignificant
part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning."'63
Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld summary judgment for
the defense in a derivative suit against the Alabama Power Company
communities in which it does business." Id. at 536. The court pointed out that
"[a]lthough a trustee's business judgment enjoys 'great judicial deference,' this
discretion is not without limit. A duty is imposed upon the trustee to maximize the value

obtained from a sale, particularly in liquidation cases." Id. at 532 (citation omitted).

Despite this duty of the Trustee "to maximize value," the court applied section 7015(2)
and found in favor of the Trustee. See id. at 531-32, 536, 538.
158. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
159. See id. at 590.
160. Seeid. at582.
161. See id. at 585-87, 589-90.
162. Id. at 585-86. Peter Hall discusses changing social and economic conditions in
similar terms and notes the rise of a managerial class without private fortunes of their
own to benefit charities:
This separation of ownership and control led to major changes in business
philanthropy. When owner-managers like Carnegie, Vanderbilt, or Pullman
diverted corporate assets for charitable purposes, they were accountable to no
one because they were, in effect, giving away their own money. Usually
modest gifts from their firms were accompanied by generous ones from their
private fortunes. The professional managers enjoyed no such discretion. They
had no private fortunes. And, because they were dealing with other people's
money, they were not free to make corporate gifts unless these could be
justified on grounds of corporate well-being.
Peter D. Doblan, Business Giving & Social Investment in the United States, in THE U.S.
IN PHILANTHROPIC GIvING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GoAts 227-28 (Richard Magat
ed., 1989).
163. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 586; see also MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra
note 12, at 318.
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brought by a shareholder and former employee who challenged the
company's installation of six power poles on the Alabama Christian
College campus free of charge. 6' The company viewed this act as part
of the company's "civic rent."' 65 The installation was not controlled by
the company's contribution policy, but it was "consistent with long time
Company policy of permitting free use of equipment to install light poles
on Little League fields, helping cities hang Christmas decorations
without charge, and installing flag Roles at many of the schools
throughout the state without charge."'
A committee of independent
directors, comprising three fourths of the entire board, concluded after
an investigation that the derivative suit was not in the best interest of the
company.'67 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
for the defense, reasoning that, "[t]o allow a suit under these
circumstances would be to substitute the judgment of the court and the
shareholder for that of the board of directors when it is obvious that the
directors are best situated to make such a determination.' '
In an extreme case, the Delaware Court of Chancery approved a nonmonetary settlement of shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits
challenging the Occidental Petroleum board's decision to spend more
than eighty-five million dollars of Occidental's money to build and fund
an art museum to house the art collected by founder and Chairman of the
Board Armand Hammer, who had acquired much of it with Occidental's
funds.' 69 The court rejected claims that the gift was a waste of

Occidental's assets, holding that given the net worth of Occidental, its
annual net income before taxes ($574 million), and the tax benefits to
Occidental, the gift was within the range of reasonableness.' 70 The court
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629, 635 (Ala. 1981).
Id. at 635.
Id.
See iU.at 635-36.

168.

Id. at 636.

169. See Sullivan v. Hammer, No. 10823, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 119, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff'd sub nom. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). The
settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that (1) the museum name be changed from
"The Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center" to the "Occidental
Petroleum Cultural Center Building"; and (2) all future charitable contributions by
Occidental to the Armand Hammer Foundation or any other Hammer-affiliated charities
be limited by the size of the dividends paid to Occidental's common stockholders. Id. at
*10-11.
170. See id. at *19. Section 122(9) of the Delaware Corporation Code expressly
authorizes charitable donations by Delaware corporations. Although section 122(9)
places no limitations on the size of a charitable corporate gift, the Delaware Court of

held that the decision was protected by the business judgment rule even
though, in the court's view, the shareholders would be warranted in
electing different directors.' The court also approved the settlement's
generous provisions limiting future contributions to Hammer-affiliated
charities to an amount equal to the dividends paid to shareholders. 2
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
directors of Ford Motor Company to pay above prevailing salary levels
and to charge less for its cars than the market would bear.1 73 Minority
Ford shareholders had sued to block board-approved expansion plans
and to demand that more special dividends be paid out of Ford's capital
surplus of almost $112 million.' 74 In his answer to the complaint, Henry
Ford (then the majority stockholder) argued that retaining large cash
reserves to fund expansion and to prevent massive layoffs in bad times
"ultimately redound to the best financial interests of the company and its
stockholders.' ' 75 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the Ford
directors' discretion to set employee wages and working conditions and
car prices, and to spend more than twenty-four million dollars to expand
the business to include the smelting of iron ore for use in the
manufacture of Ford automobiles. 6
However, the court held that at the outer limit "it is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of
a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for
the primary purpose of benefiting others."'"
In light of Ford's
exceedingly strong cash position and the regularity and size of its cash

flow going forward, the court ordered Ford to declare a special dividend
of one half of the accumulated cash surplus, less the amount of special
dividends ($2,000,000) paid after the suit was filed, for a total special
dividend of $19,275,386.
This still left Ford with a cash surplus of
more than thirty million dollars and a total surplus of more than ninety
Chancery has construed the section "to authorize any reasonable corporate gift of a
charitable or educational nature." Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,
405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
171. See Sullivan, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 119, at *12. The court characterized the
settlement as "leav[ing] much to be desired" but stated that its role in reviewing it was
quite restricted. Id. The court went on to add, "If the Court was a stockholder of
Occidental it might vote for new directors, if it was on the Board it might vote for new
management and if it was a member of the Special Committee it might vote against the

Museum project." Id.
172. Seeid. at*10-11.

173. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). For further
discussion of this case, see infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
174. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670.

175.
176.
177.
178.
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Id. at 677.
See id. at 684-85.
Id. at 684.
See id. at 677.
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million dollars.'79
IV. STwARDsHp AND CORPORATE GOVERINANCE

The state gives shareholders of a corporation limited liability, yet the
corporation derives power and resources from not just investors, but also
from other sources, including employees and the community. Indeed,
because the shareholders are often unable or unwilling to monitor
corporate conduct, and no other constituency has any legal right to do so,
we are left with the question, if not the directors, then who?"
The power of directors to consider the effect of their decisions on
nonshareholder constituencies rationally flows from the history of the
corporate form in America as an instrumentality of public good beyond
the narrow limits of shareholder value.'8' Early corporations often were
endowed with traditional state privileges such as eminent domain,
monopoly, and limited liability.82 Explicit in these quasi-public rights

was the quid pro quo of social, not simply legal and economic,
responsibility to interests broader than shareholders' profits.'83
Ronald Seavoy makes it clear that corporate charters "assumed that
corporations were legally privileged organizations that had to be closely
179. See id. at 685.
180. Rabbi Hillel asks, "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for
others, what am I? And if not now, when?" Rabbi Hillel, Individuality (visited Nov.
9, 1999) <http:llwww.cyber-nation.comlvictory/quotations/authors/quoteslhillellrabbi.
html>. To which this Article would add, "If not me, who?" For a humorous answer to
these questions, see Appendix B.
This Article recognizes, of course, that at the outer limits, if the directors make
decisions that deviate too far from the wishes of the corporation's shareholders, then the
shareholders can launch a proxy contest to replace the current board with nominees more
to their liking. The Delaware Supreme Court struck down an attempt by the board of
directors of a target company to thwart a hostile takeover by adopting a delayed band
poison pill, which could be redeemed immediately by only the directors in office
immediately before the hostile acquirer obtained control. See Quicktum Design Sys.,
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998).
181. See WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 41-77 (1997) (containing a comprehensive
review of the history of the corporate form of organization in the United States).
182. See id. at 46-47, 51. Not all corporate statutes granted all of these benefits.
The first true corporate statute, Massachusetts' Aquaduct Act of 1799, did not provide
the proprietors with limited liability. Instead, it established that any claim that remained
outstanding six months after dissolution could be pursued against the private estates of
any of the proprietors. See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
UNTIL 1860, at 263-64 (1954).
183. See Harry J. Van Buren I,Business Ethicsfor the New Millennium, 93 BUS.
& Soc'y REv., Spring 1995, at 51, 54.

scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to be made
consistent with public welfare."' 4 Louis Hartz notes, for example, that
in 1833 there was vigorous legislative opposition to Pennsylvania's
grant of a coal company charter on the grounds that the industry had
become sufficiently developed that it could attract private capital and
thus had no need for a charter.'
Joseph Davis similarly describes the
rigorous debates in which legislatures engaged on the subject of
incorporation. 86 Another scholar, John Davis, confirms that "[e]arly in
the [19"] century it was not considered justifiable to create corporations
for any purpose not clearly public in nature."'87
The public purpose tradition of the corporation retained much of its
legitimacy throughout the 20th century. President Theodore Roosevelt
commented to Congress early in the century: "Business success, whether

for the individual or for the Nation, is a good thing only so far as it is
accompanied by and develops a high standard of conduct-honor,
integrity, civic courage.... This Government stands for manhood first
and for business only as an adjunct of manhood."" President Woodrow
Wilson voiced,
I hate that old maxim, 'Business is business,' for I understand by it that
business is not moral. The man who says, 'I am not in business for my health,'
means that he is not in business for his moral health, and I am the enemy
of every business of this kind. But if business is regarded as an object for
serving and obtaining private profit by means of service, then I am with that
business ....
189

Leaders of industry echoed these sentiments. Frank Abrams, speaking
in 1951 as the chair of Standard Oil Company, said that the
responsibility of management is "to maintain an equitable and working
balance among the claims of the various directly interested groupsstockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large."'
The
testimony in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,'9 discussed
184.

RONALD E. SEAVOY,

1784-1855:

THE ORIGINS

OF THE AMERIcAN BusINEss CORPORATION,

BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION

5 (1982).

185. See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860, at 59-60 (1948).
186.

THOUGHT:

See JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN

CORPORATIONS 26 (1965).

187. 2 JOHN P. DAvIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE
STATE 269 (1961).
188.

Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1905, quoted in THE WILEY BOOK OF BUSINESS

QUOTATIONS

189.
190.
223, 241
191.

142 (1998).

Call Gov. Wilson Man with a Future,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,1911, § 1, at 3.
Robert L. Heilbroner, Controlling the Corporation,in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT
(1972) (citation omitted).
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
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above,'" suggests the importance some corporate leaders have placed on
the corporation's duty to the community:
Mr. Frank W. Abrams, chairman of the board of the Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey, testified that corporations are expected to acknowledge their public
responsibilities in support of the essential elements of our free enterprise
system. He indicated that it was not "good business" to disappoint "this
reasonable and justified public expectation," nor was it good business for
corporations "to take substantial benefits from their membership in the
economic community while avoiding the normally accepted obligations of
citizenship in the social community." Mr. Irving S. Olds, former chairman of

the board of the United States Steel Corporation, pointed out that corporations

have a self-interest in the maintenance of liberal education as the bulwark of
good government. He stated that "Capitalism and free enterprise owe their
survival in no small degree to the existence of our private, independent
universities" and that if American business does not aid in their maintenance it

is not "properly protecting the long-range interest of its stockholders, its
employees and its customers." Similarly, Dr. Harold W. Dodds, President of

Princeton University, suggested that if private institutions of higher learning
were replaced by governmental institutions our society would be vastly different
and private enterprise in other fields would fade out rather promptly. Further on
he stated that "democratic society will not long endure if it does not nourish
within itself strong centers of non-governmental fountains of knowledge,
opinions of all sorts not governmentally or politically originated. If the time
absorbed into government, then freedom as we
comes when all these centers are
know it, I submit, is at an end.193

One of the earliest proponents of corporate policies designed to
benefit employees and customers was Henry Ford, founder of the Ford
Motor Company, the third largest automobile manufacturer in the United
States. Originally, Ford's Model T sold for more than $900. The price
was lowered from time to time notwithstanding improvements made to
the car, and in 1916 the car cost $360.'" In 1914, Ford built the first
fully automated assembly line and cut the production time from twelve
hours in 1908 to an hour-and-a-half 5 When the new manufacturing
facility opened, "Ford announced unprecedented wage increases-from
an average of $2.40 for a nine-hour day to a minimum of $5.00 for an
eight-hour day.' 9 6 Even though Ford's cars were produced by the
highest-paid industrial workforce in the United States, they cost only

192.
193.

See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 583.

194.
195.

See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 670 (Mich. 1919).

See JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, A DELiCATE EXPERIMENT: THE HARVARD
Busirss SCHOOL 1908 - 1945, at 68 (1987).
196. Id.

half as much as the cars sold by Ford's nearest competitor.'97 Rather

than follow suit, many manufacturers denounced Ford for driving up

wage scales. 9
Ford's policies of selling improved cars at lower prices and paying its
workers well was driven by Henry Ford's business philosophy: "My
ambition... is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up
their lives and their homes."' 99 Ford was able to do this while still
paying its founders cash dividends in the first thirteen years of the

company's existence that were fifty times the original paid-in capital. 2°°
For the year ending on July 31, 1916, Ford's strategies of reducing price
and increasing output resulted in profits of $59,994,118 and capital

surplus (assets minus liabilities and stated capital) of $111,960,907., ° '
George W. Merck, Chair and CEO of Merck & Co., Inc. from 1925 to
1950, explained, "We try never to forget that medicine is for the people.

It is not for the profits. The profits follow, and if we have remembered
that, they have never failed to appear." More recently, Raymond V.
Gilmartin, CEO of Merck, echoed that sentiment:
We believe that our core values and adherence to high ethical standards are also
important. They support our ability to innovate and create a favorable
environment for innovation. They motivate our people and help to inspire
confidence and trust among doctors who prescribe our medicines, regulators
who approve them, health officials who decide whether or not to pay for them,
and legislators and
policy makers who can influence the cost and timeliness of
their discovery. 20 3

Numerous other recent examples of corporate stewardship abound.
When 150-year-old Levi Strauss & Co., known as one of the industry's

most benevolent employers, recently announced the closing of eleven
U.S. plants and layoffs of 5900 employees because of the decreased
demand for its goods and its decision to move more of its manufacturing
197. See id.
198. See id. at 69.
199. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
200. See id. In 1908, Ford amended its articles to increase the capital stock from
the original paid-in capital of $100,000 to $2,000,000. See id. at 669. The difference of
$1,900,000 represented the shareholders' waiver of the right to previously declared
dividends. See id. at 670. Thereafter, Ford paid regular dividends each year equal to
60% of the capital stock of $2,000,000 ($1,200,000) or 12 times the original paid in
capital of $100,000. See id, In addition, Ford paid $41,000,000 in special dividends in
the period from 1911 to 1915. See id.
201. See id. Indeed, Ford's phenomenal success prompted shareholders owning
10% of Ford's stock to sue in 1916 to demand more dividends. See supra notes 173-79
and accompanying text.
202. Raymond V. Gilmartin, Innovation, Ethics and Core Values: Keys to Global
Success, 65 VITAL SPEEcHEs OF THE DAY 209, 210 (1999).
203. Id. at 209.
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offshore, the company committed to providing a $245 million employee
package that included eight months' notice, as much as three weeks of
severance pay for every year of service, up to eighteen months of
medical coverage, an enhanced early retirement program, and a flexible
allowance of up to six thousand dollars for training and start-up
expenses.Y This stands in sharp contrast to Safeway's grant of a
maximum of four weeks severance and two weeks of medical
coverage.205 No doubt Levi's corporate values played a role in creating
the severance package. Robert Haas, CEO of Levi's, has consistently
expressed his ethical commitment and desire for corporate "aspirations"
to guide all decisions20
After the Malden Mills factory in Massachusetts, owned by Aaron
Feuerstein, burned down in December 1995, Feuerstein continued to pay
wages and benefits to workers who had no jobs as the new plant was
being built. Since the completion of the new plant, worker productivity
and quality have improved.m Feuerstein calls the gains "a direct result
of the good will of our people."2 °8
In the environmental arena, Sir John Browne, Chief Executive of
British Petroleum Amoco (BP), expressed his company's philosophy on
global warming as follows: "If we are all to take responsibility for the
future of our planet, then it falls to us to begin to take precautionary
action now." ' Toward that end, BP instituted measurable objectives in
1997 to ensure that it was doing what it could to create a sustainable
planet; these objectives included participating in the policy debate,
searching for global solutions to the problem of global warming,

developing alternative fuels for the long term, funding continuing
scientific research, and controlling the company's own carbon dioxide
emissions. 10
204.

See Miles Socha, Bad Day at Levi's: 11 Plants to Close, Costing 5,900 Jobs,

WOMEN's WEAR DAILY, Feb. 23, 1999, at 1.

205. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
206. Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems:
Influences of Executive Commitment and EnvironmentalFactors,42 AcAD. MGMT J. 41,
44 (1999).
207. See Bennett Daviss, Profits from Principle:Five ForcesRedefining Business,
FUTURiST, Mar. 1999, at 28, 30.
208. Id. Other examples include Interface, Inc., an environmentally responsible
carpet manufacturer that saved $40 million in costs, and Marriott International, whose
multilingual employee help line helped cut turnover to 35%, compared with the industry
average 100%. See id. at 28.
209. John Browne, Breaking Ranks, STANFORD Bus., Sept. 1997, at 18, 18.
210. See id.; see also Martha M. Hamilton, British Petroleum Sets Goal of 10% Cut

Other businesses are also coming forward and taking responsibility for
sustaining the planet. Niagara Tomahawk Power, a New York state

power-generation company, lowered its carbon dioxide emissions by 2.5
million tons. Then, under the U.S. emission trading program, it swapped
those carbon dioxide emission fights for carbon dioxide allowances,

which it gave to local environmental groups, who retired them.21'
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Corporate directors may (and often do), consistent with efficient
markets and the spirit and the letter of the law, consider the effects of
their decisions on constituencies other than shareholders. Indeed,
directors often agonize over decisions to close plants or layoff

workers.212 The question remains how to encourage such behavior
without jeopardizing the very freedom that such behavior is intended to
protect.
This Article recognizes that the ability to consider nonshareholder

constituencies, without more, is not sufficient either to ensure that
directors consider such constituencies in their deliberations or to prevent

management from using concern for other constituencies as a fig leaf to
cover up mismanagement or entrenchment. As Professor Berle noted in

1932, "you can not abandon emphasis on 'the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their
stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and
reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.'" 12
This Article addresses this dilemma by following the example of

proxy disclosures on executive compensation and the relationship
between executive pay and corporate performance as a means of
inducing change.1 4 In the spirit of stewardship, transparency, and selfregulation, '5 this Article proposes that the SEC add a new item to
in 'Greenhouse' Gases, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1998, at A6; William K. Stevens,
DeadlineSet to Form Rules for Reducing Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, §
1, at 1.
211. See John J. Fialka, Breathing Easy: Clear Skies Are Goal as Pollution Is
Turned into a Commodity, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 1997, at Al.
212. For example, the chairman of Stride Rite, a shoe company recognized for its
social commitments, described the decision to close its plant in New Bedford,
Massachusetts, as "a difficult decision.... Our hearts said, 'Stay,' but our heads said,
'Move."' Joseph Pereira, Split Personality:SocialResponsibility andNeed for Low Cost
Clash at Stride Rite, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 1993, at Al.
213. Berle, supra note 26, at 1367.
214. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249 (1998). For a more detailed discussion of
these changes and the forces that played a role in the SEC's actions, see Tracy Scott
Johnson, Pay for Performance: CorporateExecutive Compensation in the 1990s, 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 183 (1995).
215. The securities industry provides an excellent example of self-regulation that
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Regulation S-K

6

requiring publicly traded companies to disclose in

their annual reports on Form 10-K21 7 all board-level corporate decisions
made since the most recent Form 10-K that had a material impact on any
constituencies, including shareholders, employees, management,
customers, suppliers, creditors, the community, government entities, and
the environment." '
This proposal would give all market participants, such as investors,
employees, customers, and suppliers, the information they need to
decide whether to invest in or do business with a particular company.
1933,219
Indeed, disclosure is the cornerstone of the Securities Act of
has been remarkably effective. With authority from Congress and the SEC, the National
Association of Securities Dealers prescribes the eligibility criteria and registration
requirements for broker-dealers and their employees, administers examinations to ensure
minimum competency, and regulates the terms under which firms can underwrite
securities offerings.
Perhaps the National Association of Corporate Directors, or some like organization,
could perform a similar function for directors of publicly traded companies. In the
United Kingdom, the Institute of Directors has proposed a director certification
requirement, which it would administer. At a minimum, a self-regulatory organization
could establish minimum standards for director education concerning business ethics and
the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and oversight.
216. Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. 17
C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.19 (1998). Regulation S-K sets forth the disclosure requirements
applicable to registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 11 1997), and to periodic reports required to be filed under

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78k (1994 & Supp. In 1997).

For example, Item 103 requires, inter alia, disclosure of all pending administrative or

judicial proceedings brought pursuant to federal or state environmental laws that are
material to the company's business or financial condition. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103; see
also infra note 228 (discussing the defimition of "material"). Other items include a
description of the company's business and property, management's discussion and
analysis of financial condition and results of operations, and selected financial data. See
id. §§ 229.101, 229.102.
217. The annual report on Form 10-K contains detailed information called for by
reference to the applicable items of Regulation S-K regarding the company's business
and property, pending legal proceedings, audited financial statements for the fiscal year
just ended, and management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results
of operations. See 17 C.F.R. §249.310 (1998). It must be fied with the SEC within 90
days of the end of the company's fiscal year, and is available to the public. See id.
218. In order to permit companies to keep certain decisions confidential for
competitive reasons, the new item might give the board of directors discretion to delay
public disclosure of confidential board decisions when the directors reasonably believe
in good faith that disclosure would put the company at a competitive disadvantage. In
such a case, disclosure would be required in the Form 10-K for the year in which the
decision was made public.
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).

which was a direct result of public and governmental outrage and

distrust of the nation's financial markets that followed the stock market
crash of 1929.20 At the same time, our proposal would minimize the
appeal of governmental intervention to protect such constituencies.221

The proposed disclosure requirement is akin to the National
Environmental

Protection Act's Environmental Impact

Statement

requirements with respect to major Federal actions,'m government

sunshine laws,m and laws requiring the registration of lobbyists and the

reporting of political contributions.n4 This Article envisions a "balance

sheet" approach suggested by other scholars in the past. The extended
balance sheet would take into account implicit promises that have been
relied upon by other stakeholders but have not been reduced to writing.2
Because of the nonexplicit nature of these promises, their legal
enforceability is questionable; hence, they are generally ignored in
financial statements and corporate decision making.22
Defining materiality in this context is somewhat problematic but it is a
standard that has worked very well to protect securities holders from
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions by companies and their
directors, officers, and underwriters.m
The new Regulation S-K
220. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURrrIES REGULATION 29 (1983).
Congressman (later Speaker of the House of Representatives) Sam Rayburn stated
during the congressional debate on what became the Securities Act of 1933, "Millions of
citizens have been swindled into exchanging their savings for worthless stocks.... Safe
from the pitiless publicity of Government supervision, unrestrained by Federal statute,
free from any formal control, these few men [the hired officials of our great
corporations], proud, arrogant, and blind, drove the country to financial ruin." H.R.
5480, 74th Cong., 77 CONG. REc. 2910, 2918 (1933), reprintedin 1 FED. SEC. L. LEGIs.
HIST. 1933-1982, at 168, 176 (1983).
221. See Soros, supra note 46, at 45.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
223. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
224. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1603-1604 (1994 & Supp. mI 1997).
225. See, e.g., Cornell & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 5-14. Cornell and Shapiro
suggest the preparation of an extended balance sheet that would list the claims of noninvestor stakeholders. In particular, they suggest including on the asset side of the
balance sheet, organizational capital, which is the "current market value of all future
implicit claims the firm expects to sell." Id. at 8. On the liabilities side of the balance
sheet, they include organizational liabilities, or the "expected costs, from the firm's
standpoint, of honoring both current and future implicit claims." Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Rule 10b-5 provides in pertinent part: "It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." Id. Rule lob-5 was promulgated by the SEC under its authority as
established in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (explaining background of 10(b)).
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 1999 WL 1123073 (SEC Aug. 12, 1999), the
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requirement could provide some bright-line examples of matters that
must always be disclosed. There are several potential models of material
effects, including the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act,29 which compels employers with one hundred or more full-time
workers to notify employees sixty days in advance of an intended plant
closing or mass layoff, and Wyoming's plant siting law, which provides
that no industrial facility exceeding a certain value may be constructed

without a thorough assessment of the impact on nearby communities."
Similarly, a company could be required to disclose employee layoffs of
more than a specified percentage of their workforce in the previous
fiscal year. Or, if a company employs more than a specified percentage
of a community's workers, it could be required to disclose layoffs
involving more than a specified percentage of the company's employees
in that community. A company might also be required to disclose any
disposal of hazardous waste outside the United States that would be
illegal if disposed of in that manner within the United States.
The Safeway LBO and subsequent store closing and layoff decisions
are replete with examples of material impacts on constituencies. For
example, management gained positive material benefits, as did the
shareholders, at least in the short-term.
Employees, suppliers,
customers, and communities, on the other hand, suffered material
negative effects. While it may be impossible to predict all of the costs
and benefits of an action, thoughtful consideration and disclosure of the
probable effects will allow for more informed, thoughtful, and
(hopefully) ethical decisions.
Requiring companies to disclose the material effects of their decisions
on all corporate constituencies would have several positive byproducts
that address many of the deficiencies of the current model of corporate
staff of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant
cautioned companies and their auditors that the materiality of an item for purposes of
preparation of the audited financial statements cannot be determined solely by reference
to quantitative percentage thresholds or rules of thumb. See id. at *2. "A matter is
'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it
important." Id. The staff indicated that this formulation is in substance identical to the
formulation used by the courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. See id. (stating
that a fact is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that the ... fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available") (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449

(1976)).
229.

29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).

230. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-12-102, 106 (Michie 1999).

governance described in this Article. Specifically, disclosure would
address the issues of efficiency, fairness, and practicality that have been
advanced as justifications of the current emphasis on shareholder value.
The disclosure requirement advances economic efficiency in three
ways. First, it forces directors to consider any externalities they are
imposing on others, and to examine whether those costs are in fact less
than the expected benefits in the aggregate and whether the costs are
borne by the group receiving the expected benefits. There seems to be a
presumption that deals are either a positive sum or zero sum proposition.
It is certainly possible that corporate transactions can destroy net
economic and social value. This may have been the case with Safeway's
LBO. While this proposal does not prohibit such transactions, it would
be beneficial for this information to be made public.

Second, the disclosure requirement increases the quality and quantity
of the information that shareholders receive with respect to their
companies, and the quality and quantity of feedback that directors get
from all affected constituencies, including the shareholders they purport
to represent. In essence, disclosure helps close the social gap between
directors and the constituencies that their decisions impact.
Third, disclosure relieves the societal inefficiency caused by the
common goods problem. This Article's proposal would make it more
likely that firms not free ride and instead contribute their fair share to the
creation of public goods by illuminating attempts to "cheat." In this
way, firms such as British Petroleum Amoco, which are led by persons
willing to take the first step toward solving global problems, will not be
forced to sacrifice shareholder value by behaving responsibly. "
The disclosure requirement advances fairness by leveling the playing
field for corporations that behave ethically and those that do not. Under
current standards, the first organizations to find new ways of exploiting
externalities before social, market, legal, and regulatory pressures
foreclose or reduce those opportunities are rewarded for their behavior,
while all organizations suffer from the backlash that often follows. In
addition, if the extent of externalization is concealed, the more
responsible organizations may be forced to lower their standards as well,
akin to the economic principle
that when quality is uncertain, bad
2
products drive out good. Further, the longer the irresponsible behavior
can be concealed, the greater the potential financial gain. Disclosure
provides an earlier opportunity for counterbalancing forces to take
effect.
231. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty

and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488,488-500 (1970).
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Finally, the disclosure requirement is pragmatic. It preserves board
autonomy while allowing interested parties to make informed decisions
about their relationship with the firm. It may also reduce the socioeconomic costs borne by stakeholders affected by a corporate action by
providing stakeholders earlier warning of the decision and the
opportunity to alter their behavior to mitigate its adverse impact.
The efficacy of disclosure requirements in changing corporate
behavior is demonstrated by the effect of the executive compensation
disclosure rules. These rules require that executive compensation and

company performance be clearly presented and that the compensation
committee of the board of directors explain how they arrived at their
compensation decisions. Recent studies have shown that the disclosure
requirements have increased the relationship between compensation and
performance.M
In sum, disclosure would remove the veil of secrecy and make each
director more visible to the various constituencies, as well as the
directors' friends and relatives, for all of the consequences of the board
decisions. In the same way that publications like the Wall Street Journal
regularly include a box with the names of all the directors of a firm
involved in a corporate failure or scandal, thereby threatening their
reputational capital, 23 this Article's proposal would lead to the
identification of the individuals behind decisions to close plants, lay off
workers, dump toxic waste, or sell unsafe products. One can imagine
the discomfort a director of Ford Motor Company might have
experienced if asked at the breakfast table to explain why Ford chose to
manufacture cars with known deadly defects that could have been
eliminated for a few dollars. z 6 At the same time, this proposal would
empower those directors who want to vote their conscience and to act in
a socially responsible manner to do so by making it harder for the
"cheaters"-those who impose their social costs on others-to secretly
attain a competitive advantage thereby.
233. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240 (1998).
234. See, e.g., John Byrd & Kent Hickman, Payfor Performance: Does Disclosure
Matter?, 21 MANAGERIAL FiN. 24 (1995).
235. See generally Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls
on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. PoLTIcAL ECON. 512, 512-36 (1985); David M. Kreps &
Robert Wilson, Reputation andImperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 253-79

(1982); Edward C. Prescott & Michael Visscher, Organizational Capital, 88 J.
POLITIcAL ECON. 446, 446-61 (1980); Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product
Quality,and Seller Reputation, BELL J. ECON., Spring 1982, 20, 20-35.
236. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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TOM the

DANCING BUG "

©

1996 Ruben Boiling (author of "Tom the Dancing Bug," distributed by

Universal Press Syndicate). Used by permission. All Rights Reserved.
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If I am notfor myrelf, who
will be for tm ? If f am only

for myself, whaet am I? If
not now wf.en?

2- -4 -4cImuck

tomorrow

©

The New Yorker Collection 1999 J.B. Handelsman from cartoonbank.com.
Used by permission. All Rights Reserved.
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